Jane: John, are you familiar with Carl R. Kordig’s deontic argument for God’s existence?
John: No. I am not. Would you be kind to explain it to me?
Jane: Kordig argued that a deontically perfect being ought to exist. If deontically perfect being ought to exist, then such being can exist. A deontically perfect being cannot be a contingent being. Therefore, a deontically perfect being must exist.
John: What justification does Kordig offer to believe that a deontically perfect being ought to exist?
Jane: He believes that even though an individual may hold that God does not exist, that individual should grant that most perfect being ought to exist.
John: Well! I am not persuaded by that. Argumenti causa, say I grant that, how can a person possibly defend the idea that God, a deontically perfect being, cannot be a contingent being?
Jane: Kordig would argue that the idea of contingent God is metaphysically impossible. It is like the idea of a square that is also a circle at the same time and same sense. It is simply a logical contradiction.
John: How is contingent God a logical contradiction?
Jane: Because deontically perfect being, per definition, must possess maximal excellence in existence. Kordig assumed that, everything else being equal, necessary existence is better than contingent existence.
John: But existence is not a predicate, Jane, following Immanuel Kant.
Jane: Kordig could grant Kant’s proposal. He would argue that though existence is not a predicate necessary existence surely is.
John: Mh! I see. I do not find his argument persuasive though.
Jane: Neither do I, John. Although such arguments do not persuade us, they do offer rational justification for why theists do believe in God.
* Kordig, C. R. (1981) ‘ A Deontic Argument for God’s Existence,’ Noús Vol. 15, No. 2:207-208