In part I, The Beast Rises: The Deductive Problem of Evil, I introduced the logical problem of evil as defended by Hume and Mackie. In this second part I presented analytical Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga’s response, reception and status of logical problem evil in contemporary philosophy of religion.
Unlike the traditional responses of the problem of evil, theodicies, which attempted to give specific reasons that would justify a wholly good omnipotent God to permit evil, Plantinga offered a defense that does not provide any specific reasons but a possible, not necessarily true, proposition that will show that God and evil are logically compatible.
Plantinga produced his proposition as follows:
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely
perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being
equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren’t significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God’s omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good. (Plantinga 1974: 30)
Adding Plantinga’s propositions:
3b. It was not within God’s power to create a world containing moral good without creating one containing moral evil.
3c. God created a world containing moral good.
Proposition 4. Evil exist follows logically from 1-3, 3b and 3c showing that Mackie’s claim that the existence of God and evil are in logical contradiction, is false. Simply put, Plantinga showed that:
a. God is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good.
b. God creates a world containing evil and has a good reason for doing so. (Plantinga 1974: 26)
After Plantinga’s case Mackie admitted and surrendered the logical problem of evil. He acknowledged,
[P]roblem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another [… God] might not eliminate evils, even though it was logically possible to do so and though he was able to do whatever is logically possible, and was limited only by the logical impossibility of having the second-order good without the first-order evil. (Mackie 1982: 145)
William L. Rowe, in American Philosophy Quarterly, not only confessed but also pointed to Alvin Plantinga’s God, Freedom and Evil 1974 work p. 29-59. He wrote,
Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim. Indeed, granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly compelling argument fro the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God. (Rowe 1979: 335 fn1)
Paul Draper, in a premier philosophy journal Noûs, also “agree[s] with most philosophers of religion that theists face no serious logical problem of evil”(Draper 1989: 349 fn1 )
William P. Alston declared that Plantinga “has established the possibility that God could not actualize a world containing free creatures that always do the right thing”(Alston 1991:49) and thus “it is now acknowledged on (almost) all sides that the logical argument is bankrupt, […]”(Alston 1996: 97)
Remarking Philo’s logical argument from evil echoed by Hume, Stephen J. Wystra, wrote,
In our day the work of Plantinga and others has made much clearer the import of such broadly logical constraints, making this talk by Philo (or, only a few decades ago, by Mackie) of ‘decisive disproof’ look like naïve bluster. (Wystra 1990: 158).
James Beebe, Peter van Inwagen and Robert M. Adams gave the same verdict that Plantinga succeeded in answering the logical problem of evil.
Standing against atheists’ and theists’ philosophers, a Christian philosopher Richard G. Swinburne does not agree that Plantinga killed the logical problem of evil’s beast. He wrote,
It seems to be generally agreed by atheists as well as theists that what is called ‘the logical problem of evil’ has been eliminated, and all that remains is ‘the evidential problem’. See e.g. Paul Draper, who writes that he ‘agrees with most philosophers of religion that theists face no serious logical problem of evil’ (‘Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists’, Nous, 23 (1989), 331-50: 349). But whether that is so depends on what we understand by ‘the logical problem’. It has not been shown to the satisfaction of atheists that there is no valid deductive argument from the existence of certain evident bad states E (via some necessary moral truths) to the non-existence of God. It has been shown merely that there is no such valid deductive argument evident to theists, who dispute the validity of any such argument by disputing the necessity of the relevant purported necessary moral truths (Swinburne 1998: 20 fn. 13).
The swift in philosophy of religion literature’s focus from the logical problem of evil to the evidential problem of evil by both atheists and theists’ philosophers shows that Swinburne is incorrect. The logical problem of evil’s beast is dying a cold death in academia. Plantinga’s dagger went to deep.
Question: Can the logical problem of evil be rescued?
Previous: The Beast Rises: The Deductive Problem Of Evil
Alston, William P. (1991) The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition, in Philosophical Perspectives 6: 29-67. Reprinted in Howard-Snyder 1996.
________________ (1996) Reprint in Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Evidential Argument From Evil. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 97-125.
Draper, Paul (1989) Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem For Theists. In Noûs 23:331-350.
Hume, David (1779) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 2d ed. London.
Mackie, J. L (1971) “Evil and Omnipotence” in The Philosophy of Religion. ed. Basil Mitchell. Oxford University Press. Mackie’s case from Mind journal vol. 64 in 1955.
_______________ (1982) The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. See also p. 155
Plantinga, Alvin (1967) God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
____________________(1974). God, Freedom and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
Richard Swinburne (1998) Providence and the Problem of Evil Oxford University Press.
Rowe, William L. (1979) The Problem Of Evil And Some Varieties Of Atheism. In American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 16. 4:335-341, October 1979
Stephen J. Wykstra (1990) The Humean Objection to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 16 (1984), 73-93. Reprinted in (ed.) Marilyn M. & Robert M. Adams (1990), The Problem of Evil Oxford University Press. 138-60