Scholarly Status of Logical Problem of Evil

The logical problem of evil is dead. This is the general status of the once loved argument against the existence of an omnicompetent God in academia. The idea that existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of God is dying.

This page collects verdicts of prominent philosophers who deem that the logical problem of evil  dead, after the contribution of Nelson Pike and Alvin Plantinga. The aim is to bring awareness to those who are not familiar with philosophical status of the deductive argument from evil in academia.

J. L. Mackie On Plantinga’s Free Will Defense:

“[S]ince this defence is formally possible, and its principle involves no real abandonment of our ordinary view of the opposition between good and evil, we can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another.”(Mackie 1982: 154)

Does Karma & Reincarnation Solve The Problem of Evil?

Does the idea that human beings after the end of their current embodiment (incarnated) are embodied again (re-incarnate) merged with karma, the idea that embodiments are based on the moral quality of the previous embodiments solve the logical problem of evil, namely God and existence of evil are logically inconsistent?

Let us assume that the doctrine of reincarnation that includes another doctrine of karma is true.  Let us assume that Yajnavalkya saying in Brhadaranyaka Upanisad: “A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action.”(Upan 3.2.13) is correct. Does the moral justice unfolding itself throughout a series of embodiments solve logical problem of evil?

Agreeing with Keith E. Yandell[1], I think it does. A person who believes in reincarnation and karma can solve the problem of evil by pointing out that evil is a result of just punishment of bad actions(karma) from a person’s previous embodiment(s). Actions done in previous embodiment(s) can explain why bad things happen to good people or why infants suffer, et cetera and the verse.

Borrowing Yandell, a reincarnation and karma believer could argue:

For any evil E that occurs to a person in lifetime N, E is the just consequence of wrong actions by that person in lifetime N or in her lifetimes prior to N.(Yandell 1999, 124)

It appears that a person who believes in reincarnation and karma would have, if argued in such manner, succeed to show that God and existence of evil are logically consistent. The problem of evil is thus not a problem for those who believe such Eastern doctrines.

Yandell, Keith E. (1999) Philosophy Of Religion. Routledge: London and NY

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[1] Yandell and I do not believe that doctrines of reincarnation and karma are true.

Mackie + Plantinga: Solving The Logical Problem Of Evil

J. L. Mackie: “In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of the most theological positions; the theologian, it seems at once, must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.” (Mackie 1971: p. 92-3)

Alvin Plantinga: Theologian can consistently adhere to all three, Mackie, by adding a premise which does not have to be necessary true or even believed, but simply logically possible.

1. God is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good.
2. God creates a world containing evil and has a good reason for doing so.(Plantinga 1974: 26)

Or

3. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.

4. It was not within God’s power to create a world containing moral good without creating one containing moral evil.

5. God created a world containing moral good.

6. Therefore, evil exists.(ibid p. 54-5)

Mackie, are (2) and (4) possibly true?

Mackie: “[P]roblem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another […God] might not eliminate evils, even though it was logically possible to do so and though he was able to do whatever is logically possible, and was limited only by the logical impossibility of having the second-order good without the first-order evil ”(Mackie 1982: 145)

Note: I added  words to capture the brilliant works of Mackie and Plantinga.

Bibliography:

Mackie, J. L (1971) “Evil and Omnipotence” in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell. London: Oxford University Press.

_____________ (1982) The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Plantinga, Alvin (1974) God, Freedom and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Photo Credit: Christ Koelle illustraiton in John Piper’s  poem: Job  and The Sister Disciples of the Divine Master

St. Augustine’s Reason Why God Permit Evil

Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis(354-430)

          [S]ome people see with perfect truth that a creature is better if, while possessing free will, it remains always fixed upon God and never sins; then, reflecting on men’s sins, they are grieved, not because they continue to sin, but because they were created. They say: He should have made us such that we never willed to sin, but always to enjoy the unchangeable truth.

          They should not lament or be angry. God has not compelled men to sin just because He created them and gave them the power to choose between sinning and not sinning. There are angels who have never sinned and never will sin.

          Such is the generosity of God’s goodness that He has not refrained from creating even that creature which He foreknew would not only sin, but remain in the will to sin. As a runaway horse is better than a stone which does not run away because it lacks self-movement and sense perception, so the creature is more excellent which sins by free will that that which does not sin only because it has no free will.

A Free Will Theodicy quoted from: The Problem of Free Choices, Vol 22 of Ancient Christian Writers cited in Alvin Plantinga’s God, Freedom and Evil. p. 26-27

Pow! There Goes An Atheist Down

The Problem of Evil and Existence of God

The Holocaust

Atheist: I just do not understand how you Christians can believe in God, while there is so much evil and suffering in this world.

Christian: What is it that you do not understand?

Atheist: I do not understand because your belief about God is incompatible with the evil and suffering we encounter in this world.

Christian: How is our belief about God incompatible with existence of evil and suffering?

Atheist: Because you believe that God is totally good(omnibenevolent), all-knowing(omniscient) and all-powerful(omnipotent) and that He created the world.

Christian: Yes, that is true. But how is that incompatible with the evil and suffering we encounter in the world?

Atheist: Well, If God is good and loves all human beings, it is reasonable to believe that he want to deliver the creatures he loves from evil and suffering.

Christian: Go on.

Atheist: And, If God is all-knowing, it is reasonable to believe that he knows that evil and suffering exist and knows how to deliver his creatures from evil and suffering.

Christian: I am listening.

Atheist: And last, If God is all-powerful, it is reasonable to believe that he is able to deliver his creatures from evil and suffering.

Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II

Edited: Matthew Flannagan

In my last post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I, I sketched Tooley’s distinction between a deontological and an axiological argument from evil and argued that Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests on controversial ethical claims that are likely to be rejected by many theists. I outlined Tooley’s deontological version and explored the moral assumptions it is based on and Plantinga’s criticism of these.

Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I

Edited: Matthew Flannagan

This two-part series criticises the deontological argument from evil proposed by Micheal Tooley in The Knowledge of God, the print debate between him and Alvin Plantinga.1 My critique proceeds in four parts. Initially I will sketch Tooley’s distinction between a deontological and an axiological argument from evil and will argue that Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests on “controversial ethical claims;”2 claims that are “likely to be rejected by many theists.”3 Then I will outline Tooley’s deontological version and focus on the moral assumptions upon which it is based and Plantinga’s criticism of these. This will conclude Part I of the series.